Status report

A fifth update in succession the status of the American Airlines [AMR] Flight 587 crash investigation was issued Feb 25 by the agency of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) The safety board reports it has construct and purchased (for $92,000) a used A300-600 rudder for testing and is still looking for a composite tailfin.

The NTSB advised that it is looking further into a 1997 adventure involving another American Airlines A300, in which the airplane's bank angle upon approach went past 50 grades as the airplane stalled at gentle speed. This incident, during slope involved a series of flight hinder "oscillations" which may be similar to the oscillations the NTSB has characterized occurr in the Flight 587 case. The horde also applied full left rudder to recruit the aircraft.

In addition, this aircraft has been taken revealed of service and its tailfin is being remov and make submissiveed to ultrasound inspection at American Airlines' maintenance facility in Tulsa, Okla. The aircraft involved in this 1997 incident is about the same age as the 13-year of advanced age Flight 587 accident aircraft. The rudder from a Federal Expres A300 also has been remov for ultrasound inspection (see ASW, Feb 18) Thus, composite elements on a total of three aircraft, the accident airplane and brace others, are now being subdueed to ultrasound inspection.

The NTSB's latest update also is the other indicator that the safety board is looking at incorrect ship's company actions (see ASW, Feb. 18) Note that the NTSB incident report cites another case where simulator fidelity does not accurately replicate the actual performance of the aircraft. The same trouble was expressed by the French Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (BEA) in its fresh final report of the Air France Concorde crash (see ASW, Feb 11)

Numerous communications from pilots have been received questioning the rapid rudder mental actions recorded on the Flight 587 accident aircraft as having been caused through the pilots. "Nobody would take wing the airplane and whap the rudder back-and-forth like that, unles he's turn abouted over and there's nothing otherwise to do" said a captain with another major carrier. In an tip over recovery situation, he said partys might apply full aileron and/or rudder in single direction, but not frantically in the one and the other directions.

According to single source, a pilot has attempted to replicate in the simulator the rudder manner of movings recorded on the accident airplane. Five rudder changes were recorded in a seven-second period. The rudder is static in 38 secondarys of this seven-second period, based forward the NTSB's public account. That means five inputs to the rudder pedals were required in a 32 secondary period. Even three like movements were found to be extremely disorienting and disconcerting in the simulator, according to this account.

Finally, the NTSB announced that a cache of improperly-documented A300 repair parts not long ago uncovered in Italy does not bear onward the investigation. All parts in succession the accident A300's tail were traced. All came from original equipment manufacturers. In short, no bogus parts were upon the airplane. Nevertheless, the scandal above the Panaviation parts in Italy give an inkling ofs that the regulators' watchdogs are blind and toothless. Substandard or doubtful parts continue to be squeeze outed into service by less reputable operators. In a late Notice of Unapproved Parts, Italy's Ente Nazionale by l'Aviazione Civile (ENAC), that country's counterpart to the FAA, uttered its concern about what appears to be a widespread moot point .

An airline industry source soaked in the vicissitudes of aircraft maintenance tendered a means of better identifying approved parts. He mentions that the music industry is now applying non-reproducible holographic labels to CD It is thus readily apparent when a consequence is not bona-fide. For aircraft parts:

* Each golden part label could incorporate a hologram unique to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certified Repair Station (CRS) certifying the part as reconditioned.

* Each CR one time it has reconditioned (zero-houred) an item, would have a serial number issued which would be affixed to the golden label. The whole package would be heat-shrinked before shipping. The history of the serial number also would be placeed to an Internet-mounted database. A Wichita, Kansas-based CR might have an accreditation for repairing transponders. Its serial number might be prefaced WICH-12-(and then one four alphanumeric blocks that identify the part-maker, image of part, date of original manufacture, etc)

* The cunning part involves the use of cryptography to insert a magnetic bar collection of laws on each label. This would be the public elucidation Using a magnetic (versus optical) bar-code reader, anyone applying that part must first "read" the public tonic This puts the onus forward the user (i.e., where it is now) however makes it impossible to claim that a part was undetectably counterfeit. in what manner so? The reconditioner of the part would have used a "private key" (known solely to him) to insert the serial number forward the yellow label. That serial number, formerly turned up via the database, gives the exact same data planed immediately after the Internet database by the reconditioning CR It identifies "who, when, what and where" related to the part.